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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Section 
78-2-2(3)(j),- Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Appellant presents the following issues on appeal: 
Does a PIP Claimant injured in an automobile accident have to 
be enployed on the date of injury in order to qualify for PIP No Fault 
Disability benefits provided for under Sectioti 31(a)-22-307(1)(b)(i), 
Utah Code Annotated? 
Did the Trial Court err when it ruled that a PIP disability 
claimant must show both loss of gross income add loss of earning 
capacity to qualify for disability benefits? 
The Utah Supreme Court accords no deference to the Trial Court's 
legal conclusions given to support the grant of a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, but review(s) them for correctness. Madsen v. 
Borthick 769 P2d 245 (Ut 1988). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Section 31(a)-22-307 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended), 
reads in relevant part as follows: 
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 (1) Personal injury protection coverages 
and benefits include: . . . 
(b)(i) the lesser of $250 per week or 85% 
of any loss of gross income and loss of earning 
capacity per person from inability to work,for 
a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the loss, 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A0 NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an Appeal from a Summary Judgment granted by the Trial 
Court who held that the injured housewife was not entitled to PIP 
No Fault benefits because she was not employed on the date of in-
jury, and hence suffered no loss of gross income, 
B. COURSE AND DISPOSITION OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The housewife made written demand on the insurance company for 
payment of PIP Disability Benefits. The insurance company refused. 
The housewife filed suitc On crogs-motions for Summary Judgment 
the Trial Court ruled that the housewife was not entitled to bene-
fits. This Appeal ensued. 
C. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. The housewife was injured in an automobile accident 2/1/89. 
(R.2,11 ). 
2. Defendant insurance company was the PIP No Fault insurer 
at the time of the accident relevant herein. (R.2,11 ). 
3. The housewife had not had actual employment for at least 
13 months prior to the time of the accident. (R. 23, 55). 
4. The housewife was starting to look for work at the time 
of the accident o (R. 23 ). 
5. The housewife provided the insurer with documentation show-
ing her prior earning capacity. (R. 35, 55). 
6. The housewife was medically unable to work for one year 
following the accident. (R. 2 ). 
2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A plain reading of Section 31(a)-22-307 and the application 
of simple arithmetic shows that the Court erroneously applied the 
Statute. 
The Legislature of Utah would have used more specific lan-
guage if it intended that only those actually employed on the day 
of accident were entitled to PIP Benefits. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
TRIAL COURT FAILED TO 
PROPERLY APPLY STATUTE 
Section 31A-22-307(l) (b) (i) requires a siqiple mathematical 
computation. The relevant statutory language reads: ". . . 857o 
of any loss of gross income and loss of earning capacity . . .". 
c85 X (any loss of gross income + loss of earning capacity) = ? . 
Under the facts of this case the next step in the computation 
is: 
.85 X (0 + $180) = ? . 
The next step is: 
.85 X $180 = $153. 
It is clear from the face of the statute that a Claimant need 
not have both loss of gross earnings and loss of earning capacity. 
Loss of either is sufficient to support a claim for PIP Benefits 
based on the mathematical formula setforth by the Legislature. 
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POINT II, 
THE STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE 
THAT ONE BE EMPLOYED ON 
THE DAY OF THE ACCIDENT 
A review of the authorities shows that no case law exists in 
Utah which is directly on point with the question presented on 
this appeal. A review of the authorities of neighboring states 
as well as the leading scholarly treatise shows that the other 
states that have addressed the issue have varied widely in their 
rulings. 
In the Colorado case of Bondi v. Liberty Mutual Auto Ins0 Co., 
757 P 2d, 1101, 1102 (Colo, 1988) the Supreme Court of Colorado 
ruled that a Claimant who was employed at the time of the accident 
could not get No Fault benefits. However, it should be noted that 
the Colorado Court made much of the fact that the Colorado No Fault 
Statute only used the words "gross income". The words "loss of 
earning capacity" did not appear in the Colorado Statue. The clear 
implication of the Colorado Court's holding was that if the Legi-
slature had used "loss of earning capacity" in the statute a differ-
ent decision would have resulted. 
In the Kansas case of Morgan v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins9 Co. 
613 P 2d 684 (Kan. App0 1980), a case dealing with an unemployed per-
son who had no prior employment history and fho firm offer of future 
employment", it was ruled that a claimant needed more than a mere 
hope of employment. It was held that a claimant would need to pro-
duce evidence sufficient to convince a tryer of fact that regular 
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employment was a reasonable expectation. 
In Pennsylvania in the case of Marryshaw £/. Nationwide Mutual 
Ins. Coo, 452 A 2d 530 (1982) it was held at 532 that the absence 
of employment history was not a per se bar to entitlement to ben-
efits. However, it should be noted that the Pennsylvania statute 
specifically provided for persons who had no employment history and 
allowed such persons to collect at the rate of 50% of normal ben-
efits. (See also Minier v. State Farm Mutual |Vuto Ins. Co., 454 A 2d 
1078 (1982). 
The only thorough review of the issue presented on this appeal 
discovered by Appellant appears in Blashfield Automotive Law and 
Practice, revised 3rd edition, 1987, West Publishing Co. Section 314.9. 
Blashfield shows that the various States have requirements ranging 
from "must be employed", to "must have firm offer of employment", to 
"complete lack of earning history not being a jper se bar to recovery". 
Even in those States which usually bar benefits if one is unemployed 
at the time of the injury are generally exceptions for those who are 
"temporarilly" unemployed, such as strikers or teachers. 
Rules of Statutory Construction require tfcat when the Legislature 
uses a word that has a well known legal meaning the Courts are to 
give the word its precise legal meaning when construing the statute. 
State v. Franklin 735 P 2d 34 (Ut 1989). There is a major difference 
between the words "gross income" and "earning capacity". The Legi-
slature, had it intended that only those employed on the date of the 
accident would receive benefits "was free to use words such as 'act-
ually employed1, 'loss of gross income1, wages lost from actual em-
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ployment1, or any of a number of other phrases which would have 
clearly setforth the idea that only those who have actual employ-
ment on the date of injury are entitled to PIP Disability Benefits11. 
CONCLUSION 
The housewife involved in this case, although she had been un-
employed for 13 months, had an earning capacity. The Statute pro-
vides for compensation for those who have suffered a loss of earn-
ing capacity. While the Statute itself does not provide much guid-
ance, it is clear that the Legislature intended that accident vict-
ims be compensated. 
WHEREFORE Appellant prays for relief as follows: 
1. That the Order of the Trial Court granting Summary Judgment 
be set aside; 
2. That this matter be remanded for such other and further 
proceedings as may be appropriate in the Trial Court. 
DATED this // day of D*w**ftber/, 1££Q. W / . 
}V% 
ROBERT BREEZE k:::= 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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